Held: We are all agreed that section 14 makes depositions, properly authenticated, evidence in proceedings under the Act whether they are taken in the particular charge or not, and whether taken in the presence of the person charged or not.
Per BLACKBURN, J.-I do not see how "crimes by bankrupts against bankruptcy law" can include a person not a bankrupt, but accused of complicity in a fraudulent bankruptcy.
I agree with the A.G. that, as to many of the crimes included in the list, accessories before the fact would be included.
As to contention ii. I express no opinion beyond this that it is at least very doubtful.
(As to contention ii. see now section 2 of the Extradition Act, 1873.) (As to accessories see section 3 of the Extradition Act, 1873.)
In re Guerin (see above).
In re Custioni, L.R. Q.B.D. 1891 (1) 149; 60 L.J.M.C. 22; 64 L.T. (N.S.) 344; 17 Cox C.C. 225; 55 J.P. 328.
In re Meunier, L.R. Q.B.D, 1894 (2) 415; 63 L.J.M.C. 198; 18 Cox C.C. 15. In re Arton, L.R. Q.B.D, 1896 (1) 108; 85 L.J.M.C, 23.
In re Arton, L.R. Q.B.D. 1896 (1) 509; 65 L.J.M.C. 50; 18 Cox C.C. 277; 60 J.P. 132.
EX PARTE HUGUET,
France.
7th and 8th June, 1873.
COURT OF EXCHEQUER: KELLY, C.B, MARTIN, B., and POLLOCK, P.
12 Cox C.C. 551; 29 L.T. (N.S.) 41.
Charged with fraudulent bankruptcy in France. At Bow Street, evidence, taken in the presence of the accused-who cross-examined-of a witness, who, at a subsequent hearing, on remand, before a different Magistrate, was not present, was read as part of the case; additional evidence was taken and the accused was committed.
Contended: (i.)-The materials before the Magistrate were insufficient to prove any crime for which in this country the accused might be sent for trial.
(ii.) It cannot be that one Magistrate may take a deposition and another judge of its relevancy and importance.
Held: As to (i)-It is for the Magistrate to decide, and although we may think that the case is very inconclusive, we cannot interfere; he is the only party authorised to decide upon the facts. This is not a Court of Appeal from the Magistrate's decision.
As to (ii.)—
Per KELLY, C.B.--I entertain great doubt whether the deposition of M. de M. was admissible in evidence before Sir T. Henry.
Per MARTIN, B.-I don't mean to express any positive opinion, but I think that such evidence was admissible at common law.
Per POLLOCK, B.--This (evidence) was taken in the presence of the prisoner, and I should have thought that it was receivable.
(As to (ii) see In re Guerin, 58 L.J.M.C. 42; 16 Cox C.C. 596; 53 J.P. 467; 60 L.T. 538: 37 W.R. 289.)
(As to POWER OF COURT OF KING'S BENCH UPON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, see also In re Maurer, 32 L.J.M.C. 105; 10 Q.B.D. 513.
UNITED STATES v. LAWRENCE.
U.S.A. CIRCUIT COURT, NEW YORK.
13 Cox C.C. 361.
Lawrence was extradited to the U.S.A. in March, 1875, for “forging and uttering a certain bond and affidavit within the U.S.A."
Upon indictment before the Circuit Court of the United States, held at the city of New York, for forging and uttering a certain bond of one Blanding and also a certain affidavit known as the "Owner's Oath," purporting to be made by Blanding, Lawrence filed a special plea to the jurisdiction of the Court, averring that he was charged with offences other than those on which his extradition was grounded, and set up the British Extradition Act, and that there was an understanding that he was to be tried only for the crime stated in the extradition warrant.
Held: Per BENEDICT, J.-Extradition proceedings do not secure the person surrendered immunity from prosecution for any offence other than the one upon which his surrender is made. An offender against the justice of his country can acquire no rights as between himself and justice by flight: he remains at all times and everywhere liable to be called to answer to the law for his violations thereof, provided he comes within the reach of its arm. The English statute of 1870 cannot be held to have had the effect in the United States of securing an extradited person from trial for an offence other than that for which he is extradited. An agreement between the representatives of the two governments cannot have the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction to try him for offences other than that for which he is extradited. See Scott's case in the King's Bench (9 B. & C. 447). Scott was seized in Brussels, and carried to London without extradition or other legal process: "We are to take care that such a party is amenable to justice, and cannot inquire into the circumstances under which he was brought here."
(See case of Commonwealth v. Hawes in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 17th April, 1878: "A person surrendered to the U.S.A. under the treaty of 1843 cannot be tried upon a charge different from that for which he was extradited, and for which his surrender could not have been demanded." 14 Cox C.C. 135.)
(And see now Article III. of the Convention with the U.S.A. of 12th July, 1889.)
9
$
Held: We are all agreed that section 14 makes depositions, properly authenticated, evidence in proceedings under the Act whether they are taken in the particular charge or not, and whether taken in the presence of the person charged or not.
Per BLACKBURN, J.-I do not see how "crimes by bankrupts against bankruptcy law" can include a person not a bankrupt, but accused of com- plicity in a fraudulent bankruptcy.
agree with the A.G. that, as to many of the crimes included in the list, accessories before the fact would be included.
As to contention ii. I express no opinion beyond this that it is at least very doubtful.
(As to contention ii. see now section 2 of the Extradition Act. 1873.) (As to accessories see section 3 of the Extradition Act, 1873.)
In re Guerin (see above).
In re Custioni, L.R. Q.B.D. 1891 (1) 149; 60 L.J.M.C. 22; 64 L.T. (N.S.) 344;
17 Cox C.C. 225; 55 J.P. 328.
In re Meunier, L.R. Q.B.D, 1894 (2) 415; 63 L.J.M.C. 198; 18 Cox C.C. 15. In re Arton, L.R. Q.B.D, 1896 (1) 108; 85 L.J.M.C, 23.
In re Arton, L.R. Q.B.D. 1896 (1) 509; 65 L.J.M.C. 50; 18 Cox C.C. 277 %
60 J.P. 132.)
EX PARTE HUGUET,
France.
7th and 8th June, 1873.
COURT OF EXCHEQUER: KELLY, C.B, MARTIN, B., and POLLOCK, P.
12 Cox C.C. 551; 29 L.T. (N.S.) 41.
Charged with fraudulent bankruptcy in France. At Bow Street, evidence, taken in the presence of the accused-who cross-examined-of a witness, who, at a subsequent hearing, on remand, before a different Magistrate, was not present, was read as part of the case; additional evidence was taken and the aceused was committed.
Contended: (i.)-The materials before the Magistrate were insufficient to prove any crime for which in this country the accused might be sent for trial.
(ii.) It cannot be that one Magistrate may take a deposition and another judge of its relevancy and importance.
Held: As to (i)-It is for the Magistrate to decide, and although we may think that the case is very inconclusive, we cannot interfere; he is the only party authorised to decide upon the facts. This is not a Court of Appeal from the Magistrate's decision.
As to (ii.)—
Per KELLY, C.B.--I entertain great doubt whether the deposition of M. de M. was admissible in evidence before Sir T. Henry.
Per MARTIN, B.-I don't mean to express any positive opinion, but I think that such evidence was admissible at common law.
Per POLLOCK, B.--This (evidence) was taken in the presence of the prisoner, and I should have thought that it was receivable.
(As to (ii) see
In re Guerin, 58 L.J.M.C. 42; 16 Cox C.C. 596; 53 J.P. 467; 60 L.T. 538 :
37 W.R. 289.)
(As to POWER OF COURT OF KING'S BENCH UPC PPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, see also
In re Maurer, 32 L.J.M.C. 105; 10 Q.B.D. 513.
UNITED STATES v. LAWRENCE.
U.S.A. CIRCUIT COURT, NEW YORK.
13 Cox C.C. 361.
Lawrence was extradited to the U.S.A. in March, 1875, for “forging and uttering a certain bond and affidavit within the U.S.A."
Upon indictment before the Circuit Court of the United States, held at the city of New York, for forging and uttering a certain bond of one Blanding and also a certain affidavit known as the "Owner's Oath," purporting to he made by Blanding, Lawrence filed a special plea to the jurisdiction of the Court, averring that he was charged with offences other than those on which his extradition was grounded, and set up the British Extradition Act, and that there was an understanding that he was to be tried only for the crime stated in the extradition warrant.
Held: Per BENEDICT, J.-Extradition proceedings do not secure the person surrendered immunity from prosecution for any offence other than the one upon which his surrender is made. An offender against the justice of his country can acquire no rights as between himself and justice by flight: he remains at all times and everywhere liable to be called to answer to the law for his violations thereof, provided he comes within the reach of its arm. The English
statute of 1870 cannot be held to have had the effect in the United States of securing an extradited person from trial for an offence other than that for which he is extradited. An agreement between the representatives of the two governments cannot have the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction to try him for offences other than that for which he is extradited. See Scott's case in the King's Bench (9 B. & C. 447). Scott was seized in Brussels, and carried to London without extradition or other legal process: "We are to take care that such a party is amenable to justice, and cannot inquire into the circum- stances under which he was brought here."
10629
(See case of Commonwealth v. Hawes in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 17th April, 1878: "A person surrendered to the U.S.A. under the treaty of 1843 cannot be tried upon a charge different from that for which he was extradited, and for which his surrender could not have been demanded." 14 Cox C.C. 135.)
(And see now Article III. of the Convention with the U.S.A. of 12th July, 1889.)
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